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IN THE
UTAH SUPREME OOURT

DONALD R. ALLEK-PETITIONER
vs.
TIE STATE OF UTAH-RESFONDENT

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UTAH
COURT OF APPEALS

PETITIONER, Donald R. Allen, respectfully prays that a writ
of certiorari issue to review the judgement and opinion of the
Utah Court of Apoeals granting summary disposition and dismissing
his appeal from a conviction of aggravated assault in the Second
Judicial District Court.
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals is cited as State of
Utah v. Donald R. *\llen, 910316-CA, filed 2 December 1991. The
opinion is unpublished and is included a appendix A to this
petition.

1.

JURISDICTION
The ^ourt of Appeals1 Opinion in this matter was filed on
2 )ecenber 1991• A timely motion for an extension of time was filed
in this Court, to allow the petitioner to file this petition, on
31 December 1991.
Jurisdiction to hear this matter is conferred on this Court
pursuant to Pule 42 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, and
Title 78-2-2(3)(a), of the Utah Code Ann.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
Article I section 12 of trie Utah Constitution is set forth
in Appendix B.
Amendment VI to the United States Constitution is set forth
in Appendix C.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The petitioner was convicted of aggravated assault in the
Second Judicial district Court, Judge Douglas Cornaby presiding.
An appeal was taken, and filed in the Utan Court of Appeals.
The petitioner retained Stanley Adams to brief and argue his
appeal in the Court of Appeals. Prior to the time the brief was
filed by Ilr. Adams, the petitioner made numerous attempts to
contact him and communicate points the petitioner wanted incluied
the appeal. Kr. Adams made no attempt to comply withthe petitioners
wishes. Kr. Aiams sought and received several extensions of time
in which to file the brief in the first appeal. ..hen the brief
was in the initial stages Mr. Adams contacted the petitioner and

2.

told him that ne could be more creative in the writing of the
brief, if the petitioner wouli send him more money, r-.s the
oetitioner was incarcerated, and could raise no further cash, he
told i'.r. Adams that he could not give him more money.
Kr.

Adams then filed the brief. The brief filed by counsel did

not reet the requirements of the court and was returned to be made
to comnly with the Pules of Appellate Procedure. The brief was then
refiled, however, counsel had failed to make any reference to any
case supporting the petitioners position, nor had ne cited any
statutes, or law. T he brief was bare of anything other than one
long argument. The court ruled in favor of the state without
oral argument. The courts unpublished decision is set forth in
Appendix D. Prior to the courts decision, the petitioner filed a
motion for appointment of counsel, and an extension of time so
that new counsel could re-brief the case. The court denied the
motion, "he motions are set forth in Appendix E. The motion for
appointment of counsel made clear that counsel was not following
the wishes of the oetitioner, was trying to get more money to
write a better brief, and generally sabotaging tne appeal.
Afetr the courts opinion was released, the petitioner filed
a petition

for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to Rule 65B(i),

of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in tne

,rr,

hird Judicial

District Court. The petition is set forth in Appendix F. Judge
Noell of the Third Judicial District Court, upon recommendation

of deputy Attorney General Kirk Torgenson, vacated the petitioners
sentence, and orderei. the petitioner resentenced so tnat he ma;
perfect a new appeal. T^e Gourts order is set forth in appendix G.
The netitioner was resentenced by Judge Cornaby to tne same
terms of imprisonment. Counsel was appointed by the court to
undertake a new appeal. Fr. .tephen Oda was appointed to represent
the petitioner. 3efore the appeal was completed Kr. Oda was relieved
as a public defender and t r. I'ichael Tlurohy was appointed to
finish the appeal started by kr. Cda. After I^r. Vurnpy was appointed
as counsel, the petitioner contacted him numerous times, and made
clear that he wanted to review the material filed by counsel, prior
to it being filed in the Court of Appeals. The petitioner also
asked several times if Kr. Murphy had the decision of the Third
District Court, so that he could file it with the Court of Appeals,
and advise them of the reason for the resentencing, and second
appeal. Counsel advised him that he had it, and that he filed it
with the court.
The State, by and through J Kevin Kurphy, filed a motion for
summary disposition and requested that the appeal be dismissed, as
the petitioner had already had one appeal, ho one in the Attorney
Generals Office ever communicated that the counsel for tne State
at the hearing in Third District Court nad moved for the petitioner
to be resentenced to perfect an appeal. Likewise, counsel for
the petitioner, despite his claims, never advised the court in the
premise, of the reason for the second appeal, ^e never filed a
cony of the lower courts decision, or included it in his response

to the States motion. This is clearly reflected in trie Court of
Anneals decision. Counsel's response in set forth in Appendix H.
After the courts decision was released, counsel waited for
29 days to advies the Petitioner of the decision. Nine days past
the tine wr.en a petition for rehearing could have been filed, and
counsel couli have advised the court tnat the petitioner was resentenced to oerfect his appeal as of right. When contacted by
the petitioner, counsel toll rim that even if he won on appeal,
the prosecutor would charge him with a nore sever crime, and that
he should takes his chances with the 3oard of Pardons. As this
Court is aware, a defer lant cannot be cnarged with a more severe
crime after a successful appeal.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
Certiorari should be granted for two reasons: This petition
presents an issue already resolved by this Court, and the decision
below conflicts, by implication, with previous decisions of this
Court.
This Court visited the issue of ineffective assistance of
counsel in Dunn v. Cook, 791 P.2d 873 (Utah 1990). Holding that
an

Anders brief filed by counsel, such as it was was insufficient

to have aff- rde 1 the appellant effective assistance of counsel.
Such was tne case in the instant matter. Judge i\oell found tnat
counsels failure to file an adequate brief denied the petitioner
of his right to effective assistance of counsel. The resentencing
of the petitioner was in essence under tne standard set forth in

State v, Johnson, 6*55 ?.2d 31 (1981).
T

his Court has r.e 1 i that ineffective assistance of counsel on

appeal is not a car to further review, ^ee Junn at 878. The error
in this matter cane wnen counsel failed to aivise the court of the
ture ^acts of the case. If counsel ineffectively represents his
client, is the client prejudiced. In )unn this Court held that,
11

The doctrines of waiver and res judicata do not stand as an

unyeilding bar to the litigation of claims that eitner once were
or corld have been litigated in a prior proceeding.

.

.

• The

policy of finality certainly does have a high place in our hierarcny
of judicial values, but that policy is not so compelling as to be
more important than tne vindication of a person1s constitutional
right to a fair trial, notwithstanding the defaults of a defendants
attorney." Kurst v. Cook 777 P.2d 1029, 1034-35 (Utah 1989).
In Dunn this Court stated; "Howsoever desirable it may be to
adhere to the rules, the law should not be so blind and unreasoning
that where an injustice has resulted the defendant should be without
a remedy." The petitioner in the instant matter has been lenied
effective assistance of counsel throughout tne duration of this
matter.

TT

is original appellate counsel filed a useless brief, and

then counsel on this appeal failed to aivise the court of the facts
relevent to the appeal, and the reason for the resentencing.
Counsel failed to investigate the circumstances of the macter, and
his failure prejudiced the petitioner. Jee otate v. Frame 723 P«2d
401, 405 (Utah 1986). Under the standard set f.rth in Strickland

£

7, \ashinpton, £66 b.S. 580, zre

netitiorer must snou tnat nis

counsel nerfomance fell below a reasonable standard, ^nder
Strickland,

n

the Sixtn Ameniment imposes on counsel a duty to

investigate, because reasonaol*; effective assistance must be
cased on professional decision and informed legal choices can De
nade only after investigation of options." _Id. at 690-91.
It is oovious that the petitioner was prejudiced due to counsels
failure to advise the court wny tne petitioner was resentenced.
Counsels failure satisfies the two orong Strickland standard,
Tf counsel had performed reascrably, the court wouli not nave
granted summary iisoosition. See also State v. /erde, 101 Utah Adv
Rep. at 38.
As this Court stated in Dunn, tne law should not be so
blind as to ignore an obvious injustice. The petitioner is only
trying to get his first appeal as of rignt. x.e r.as been continually
denied effective assistance of counsel. His first appeal was lost
because counsel failed to cite law or supporting case citing, his
second appeal was lost because counsel failed to advise the court
of the circunstances. Txnis Court has the opportunity to rig.it
a number of wrongs.
WHEREFORE the petitioner prays that this Court will grant
certiorari and review this matter, and allow the petitioner to his
right of appeal.
)ATFD this

day of January, 1992.

Sonald R. Allen
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State of Utah,
Plaintiff and

Appellee,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Publication)
Case No. 910316-CA

v.
Donald Ray Allen,
Defendant and Appellant.

F I L E D
(December 2, 1991)

Second District, Davis County
The Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby
Attorneys:

Michael D. Murphy, Kaysville, for Appellant
R. Paul Van Dam and J. Kevin Murphy, Salt Lake City,
for Appellee

Before Judges Russon, Bench, and Greenwood•
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Donald Ray Allen seeks to appeal from his
conviction for aggravated assault, a third degree felony* The
case is before the court on a sua sponte motion for summary
disposition based upon the fact that appellants appeal has
previously been considered and determined by this court. Both
appellant and the State of Utah have filed responsive memoranda.
The original Judgment, Sentence and Commitment was entered
on March 20, 1989. Appellant filed a notice of appeal on July
19, 1989. The conviction was later affirmed in an unpublished
decision. See State v. Allen, No. 890449 (Utah App. May 29,
1990) (per curiam). That decision fully considered the merits of
appellant's claim that the evidence presented at trial was
insufficient to support the jury's verdict. Appellant did not
file a petition for rehearing in this court or a petition for
writ of certiorari in the Utah Supreme Court.
On April 1, 1991, the trial court entered a second judgment
and commitment and reimposed the original sentence. On April 12,
1991, appellant filed a notice of appeal from that judgment. The
trial court record reflects that the trial court appointed
counsel to handle an appeal and has monitored the progress of the
appeal.

This court requested memoranda addressing why this appeal
should not be summarily disposed of, based upon the culmination
of appellant's original appeal of right. The State of Utah has
addressed this issue; however, appellant simply reargues the
merits of the sufficiency of the evidence claim and completely
fails to consider the threshold issue raised by this court. The
State notes that the trial court record does not contain any
explanation for resentencing appellant to allow a second appeal.
The State then urges affirmance based upon res judicata by virtue
of this court's determination of the original appeal, which
raised insufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction as
its sole issue.
The procedure and authority to re-sentence a criminal
defendant and allow an appeal of right after the expiration of
the time to appeal has its source in State v. Johnson, 63 5 P.2d
3 6 (Utah 1981). That case provides that where a defendant has
been denied his constitutional right to an appeal, the defendant
may file a motion for relief under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
Rule 65B (i). In Johnson, defendant's appointed appellate
counsel failed to file a notice of appeal, despite defendant's
repeated requests. The Utah Supreme Court stated:
If the facts alleged by the defendant are
true - that within the statutory period for
appeal he requested counsel to take an appeal
and counsel gave defendant reason to believe
that he would but then failed to do so defendant was denied a constitutional right
and must be provided an opportunity to take a
direct appeal from his conviction. His
remedy to establish the denial of his right
to appeal is not in this court; it lies in
the district court, which can receive
evidence (including the taking of oral
testimony, if necessary) and make findings of
fact.
635 P.2d at 38.
In this case, there is no indication that the resentencing
resulted from a motion under State v. Johnson, and the record
contains no findings of fact in support of resentencing. In
addition, appellant's conviction was affirmed after appellant
fully pursued his first appeal of right. Accordingly, any
subsequent challenge to the conviction must be by way of a
collateral attack and under the restrictions applicable to such
challenges. See, e.g., Dunn v. Cook, 791 P.2d 873 (Utah 1990).
Appellant is not entitled to a second direct appeal from his
conviction.

The appeal is dismissed based upon our prior affirmance of
the conviction in the first appeal of right.

/2
Leonard H. Russon, Judge

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

APPENDIX E

:\??!2-DIX 3
^iRTICLE I SIJCTICXT 12

In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend
in person and by counsel , to demand the nature of the accusation against bin,
to liave a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to }:e confronted by
witnesses against him, to liave compulsory process to compel witnesses in his
ov/n belialff to have a speedy and public trial by -an impartial jury, of the county
or district where the offense was alleged to have been committed and the right
to appeal in all cases.

APPEN JIX C

"\P?£I T)IX C
YTTTDT?^ VI r.?0 7I£E CONSTITUTION 07

In vail criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy tne right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wiierein the
crime shall lave "?een committee, ;£iich district snail have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation;
to be confronted with witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for
his defense.

APPENDIX D

COVER SHEET
CASE TITLE:
State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appel~.ee,
v.
Don Allen,

Case No. 890449-CA

Defendant and Appellant.
PARTIES:
Stanley S. Adams
Attorney for Appellant
807 East South Temple, Suite 101
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
R. Paul Van Dam
Attorney General
Judith H. Atherton
B U I L D I N G
MAIL
TRIAL JUDGE:
Honorable Douglas Cornaby
May 29, 1990. MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Publication)
This cause having been heretofore argued and submitted, and
the Court being sufficiently advised in the premises, it is
now ordered, adjudged and decreed that the judgment of the
district court herein be, and the same is, affirmed.
Opinion of the Court by PER CURIAM.
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 29th day of May, 1990, a true
and correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM DECISION was
deposited in the United States mail or personally delivered to
each of the above parties.

TRIAL COURT:

Deputy C l e r k Z
^>
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Davis County Court Second District Court Case No. 6187

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooooo

FILED
MAfc£ 91990

S t a t e of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

MEMORANDUM DECISIONJirtiC^urfrfA^weis
(Not f o r P u b l i c a t i o n )

v.
Case No. 890449-CA
Donald R. Allen,
Defendant and Appellant.

Before Judges Billings, Greenwood, and Davidson.
PER CURIAM:
Defendant appeals from his conviction of assault/ a third
degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(1)(b)
(1990). Defendant claims on appeal that the evidence is
insufficient to support the conviction. We affirm.
The State claims the court should decline to rule on the
merits of the appeal because defendant's brief contains no
citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record
relied on. Although we could dispose of the case on this
basis, we decline to do so and instead examine the merits of
the appeal.
In reviewing a claim that the evidence is insufficient to
support a conviction, we view the evidence in the record and
all the inferences which may be drawn from it in the light most
favorable to the jury's verdict. State v. Booker, 709 P.2d
342, 345 (Utah 1985). In addition, we recognize that it is the
jury's exclusive function to determine the credibility of the
witnesses and we defer to the jury's determination as long as
there is some evidence, including reasonable inferences, from
which findings of all the requisite elements of the crime can
reasonably be made. State v. Lactod, 761 P.2d 23, 27 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988).
Defendant and Gwen Allen were married on July 17, 1988.
On July 23, 1988, defendant, Gwen, defendant's two minor
children and some friends spent the afternoon riding horses.
The four adults consumed beer during the afternoon. After
returning home to defendant's parents' residence where
defendant, Gwen, and the two children lived, defendant took his

children into the house. Defendant and Gwen sat in defendant's
father's pick-up truck drinking beer. While defendant and Gwen
were in the truck, Gwen was shot in the right side of her head
with a Smith and Wesson .44 Special. Defendant and his mother
carried Gwen into the house, gave her a shower and put her to
bed. Defendant removed the bloody seat cover from the truck
and washed it. Gwen remained in defendant's parents' home for
the next week without medical assistance. Julie Krump,
defendant's friend, called during that week and was not
permitted to speak with Gwen.
On July 30, 1988, defendant and his mother took Gwen to
the hospital. After an x-ray revealed bullet fragments in
Gwen's brain, Gwen underwent surgery to remove the bullet
fragments and ultimately recovered.
At trial, defendant testified that on the night of the
shooting incident, Gwen was depressed about a prior arrest, got
the gun and talked about suicide. Defendant claimed he took
the gun away, but after Gwen grabbed for it, it went off in her
face. Gwen testified that she could not remember the gun
discharging. Both defendant and Gwen testified that they were
unaware at the time of the shooting that Gwen had been shot and
did not know she had been shot until Gwen was in the hospital.
However, police and medical personel testified that Gwen had
two wounds on her head, black eyes and swelling. In addition,
a police investigation revealed bloody sheets and pillows in
the room where Gwen stayed for the seven days following the
shooting.
The State's expert testified that Gwen's injury could not
have been self-inflicted. Defendant's expert testified that
the gun would not discharge by being bumped and was not very
likely to discharge without the trigger being pulled.
Detective Hedenstrom who interviewed defendant on July 30 and
August 2 testified that defendant gave about seven different
versions of the shooting incident during the initial
interview. In each version, defendant stated that the gun
accidently discharged. In addition, a nurse caring for Gwen in
the intensive care unit testified that she overheard defendant
tell his mother, "I did it, I didn't mean to hurt her. I only
meant to scare her. We were struggling over the gun." The
jury found defendant guilty of aggravated assault.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(1)(b) provides "[a] person
commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in
Section 76-5-102 and he: uses a dangerous weapon as defined in
Section 76-1-601 or other means or force likely to produce
death or serious bodily injury.- Assault is defined as "an

act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes
bodily injury to another.- Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (1990).
Further, aggravated assault can be committed by intentional,
knowing or reckless conduct. State v. McElhanev, 579 P.2d 328
(Utah 1978) .
In this case, the evidence established that Gwen was
injured with a gun, clearly force likely to produce death or
serious bodily injury. The State's expert testified that the
injury could not have been self-inflicted and defendant's own
expert testified that the gun would not discharge without the
trigger being pulled. Further, the nurse's testimony that
defendant indicated that he did not mean to hurt Gwen but was
only trying to scare her, establishes that defendant, at a
minimum, acted recklessly. In light of the evidence presented
at trial, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to
support defendant's conviction.
The conviction is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR:

^uc^Jfcte—M^ Billings, Judge"

Richard C. Davidson, Judge

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

APPENJIX E

DO^ALD PAY ALLS:;
Pro 3e
P . O . Eox 250
D r a p e r , U t a h 84020
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
000O000

STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff-Appellee,

EXPARTE MOTION FOR

v.

ENLARGEMENT OF TIME

30NAL3 RAY ALLEN,
Defendant-Appellant.

Case No.

890449-CA

000O000

COKES NOW the Defendant, Donald Allen, and pursuant to Rules
22 and 23 of this Court, Moves this Court to grant the defendant
an extension of time to seek other counsel and to allow the Court
time to decide defendants Motion for Appointment of Counsel.
This Motion is based on the attached Motion for Appointment of
Counsel.
DATED THIS 23rd DAY OF JANUARY, 1990.

A/V

7-

r-i^U-'

DONALJ RAY ALLEN
PRO SE

'///c

CERTIFICATE

OF

MAILING

I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT I MAILED A TRUE AND CORRECT COFY OF THE
FOREGO I!!:- MOTIONS FOR APPOINTMENT OF CCLNSSL AND FOR ENLARGEMENT
OF TIME TO:

AoS'T UTAH ATT'Y GENERAL JUDITH 3 . H. ATHERTON AT

236 STATE CAPITOL, SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, 8 4 1 1 4 , AND STANLEY 3 .
ADAMS, 807 EAST SOUTH TZKPLE, SUITE 1 0 1 , SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH
8 4 1 0 2 , POSTAGE PRE-PAID, ON THE

- ''

DAY OF JANUARY, 1 9 9 0 .

DONALD RAY ALLEN

DONALD RAY ALLEN
P r o Se
P . O . Rox 250
D r a n e r , Utah
84020
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
000O000

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT
OF COUNSEL

DONALD RAY ALLEN

Case No. 890449-CA

Defendant-Appellant.

C a t a g o r y No. 2
000O000

COKES NO./ the Defendant, Donald P. Allen and pursuant to
Rule 23, Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, Rule 40 of the Rules
of the Utah Court of Appeals and Title 77, Chapter 32, Section 1
(3) of the Utah Code .mn#l Moves this Court to Appoint Counsel
to represent him in the above-entitled matter. In support of this
Kotion the defendant states;
1. That counsel of record Stanley Adams has continually
and intentionally tried to disrupt the defendants right to appeal
which is evidenced by the numerous Motions for Extension of Time
to file defendants 3rief.
2. That when the brief was finally filed it had to be returned
because it was not covered properly and the pa^es were only typed
and printed on one side.

1.

3. That when the final copy of the Brief was finally filed
it did not include any case law by which this Court could base
any iecision, nor was there any governing authority cited.
4. That counsel failed to comply with tne Rules of the Utah
Court of Appeals, Rule 24 (a) (9), when he prepared his brief.
5. That defendants counsel failed to give this Court any
basis on which to make or form an opinion.
6. m hat counsel continually demands money for the ineffective
services he provides, and tells the defendant that unless he can
produce more money that he might not win his appeal.
7. That counsel appears to be intentionally sabotaging the
''

defendants appeal because after paying counsel ^ 2,000.00 and
giving counsel ^ firearm^ valued at i 800.00, the defendant cannot
at this time give him any further money*
WHEREFORE, the Defendant prays that this Court will hold a
Hearing pursuant to Pule 40 of this Court and dismiss counsel
Stanley Adams, and appoint competent counsel to represent him in
this matter.
DATED THIS 23rd DAY OF JANUARY, 1990*

//

/°*fegVZ'l

s~

/

//'

DONALD R. ALLEN

__•'
(

/

n

t' '/f//-

APPENDIX F

Donald Ray Allen
Attorney Pro Se
Utah State Prison
P.O. Box 250
Draper, Utah 84020

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
DONALD RAY ALLEN,
De f endant.

*
* PETITION FOR WRIT OF
* HABEAS CORPUS
*
* Case No.
*
* Judge

COMES NOW the Petitioner, DONALD RAY ALLEN, and for cause of
action alleges as follows:
1.

A commitment order was issued on the 14th Day of March,

1989, by the Honorable Judge Douglas C. Cornaby, Judge of the
Second Judicial District court in and for the County of Davis,
State of Utah, in a criminal complaint which had charged Petitioner
with Aggravated Assault, Firearm Enhancement.
2.

That Petitioner was sentenced to two terms in the Utah

State Prison for 0-5 years, both sentences to run consecutively.
3.

That Petitioner is currently located at the Utah State

Prison, P.O. Box 250, Draper, Utah 84020.

4.

That

Petitioner's

restraint

is

unlawful

and

unconstitutional in that Petitioner's guilty verdict was based upon
ineffective

assistance of counsel, a violation of the

6th

Amendment to the United States Constitution, in that:
a.
because

Defendant was denied reasonable access to the court

ineffective

assistance

of

counsel

in

the

following

respects:
1.

Counsel did not attempt to introduce evidence
of a piece of lead from bullet, and photos of
the windshield, which should

have been a

material part of Defendant's defense;
2.

Defendant's
evidence

counsel

that

failed

Defendant's

to
wife

introduce
(victim)

attempted suicide again, two weeks before the
trial);
3.

Defendant's counsel failed to object to a video
of a re-enactment of the incident. Said video
was presented without sound and narrated by
police officers. The video without sound and
mandated by the officers had prejudicial effect
upon Defendant's defense;

4.

Defendant's counsel failed to challenge four
jurors, who should have been discharged for
2

cause because of prior knowledge of the case
through

the media, and being questionably

acquainted with the prosecuting attorney and
the police officers;
Defendant's counsel failed to challenge an
invalid

search warrant, which enabled the

police to search Defendant's truck on the
street and again in the house later;
Defendant's

counsel

failed

to

object

to

testimony by the Defendant's wife (the victim)
based on inter-spousal privilege;
Defendant's

counsel

failed

to

object

to

statements listed from Defendant that were
extracted by coercion at the hospital;
Defendant's counsel failed to investigate any
of the essential facts of the case, or to
prepare for trial. Defendant's counsel did not
even get a police report or rap sheet until
after the first recess at trial;
Defendant's counsel failed to appeal the case
after having been requested to appeal several
times;
Counsel failed to impeach two state witnesses
3

who perjured themselves on the stand;
11.

Counsel failed to get pre-sentence report until
sentencing day, and failed to go over it with
me to challenge any inaccuracies as stated by
law to do within ten days of sentencing;

12.

Counsel failed to call any witnesses that would
help Petitioner's case, failing to call any
expert witnesses on Petitioner's behalf;

13.

Counsel failed to familiarize himself with
alternative sentencing;

14.

Counsel failed to disclose what if any strategy
he planned on using at trial.

b.

The evidence presented to the jury clearly does not

support a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.
c.

Appellate

counsel

submitted

a brief

for Petitioner

containing irrelevant facts and no case law.
d.

There was prosecutorial misconduct in that the State made

numerous uninvited

statements

in closing argument which were

prejudicial, misleading, untrue and statements which were in
opposition to the evidence presented at trial.
e.

Court failed to inform Petitioner of his basic right to

appeal.
f.

Each element of the offense was not proven beyond a
4

reasonable doubt as required by Section 76-1-501 U.C.A. (1953 as
amended.)
5.

That Petitioner has been transferred from the county jail

to the Utah State Prison and is there currently serving his term.
6.

That the above matters have not been previously ruled

upon.
WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that this Court:
1.

Schedule a hearing at which time Petitioner may be

represented.
2.

Permit Petitioner, who remains indigent, to proceed

without prepayment of costs, fees or other assessments and appoint
petitioner counsel.
3.

Grant Petitioner the authority to obtain subpoenas in

Forma Pauperis, for witnesses and documents necessary to assist in
the proof of the facts alleged in the petition as stated above.
4.

Issue a Petition for Post Conviction Relief to have the

Petitioner brought before it, to the end that he may be discharged
from the illegal and unconstitutional confinement and restraint.
Dated this

day of

, 1990.

DONALD RAY ALLEN
Attorney Pro Se
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APPENDIX

R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312)
Attorney General
KIRK TORGENSEN (4927)
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake Citv, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1021
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
DONALD RAY ALLEN,

:
ORDER

Petitioner,

:

v.

:

STATE OF UTAH, Utah
State Prison,

:

Case No, 900907518
Judge Frank G. Noel

Respondents.
The above entitled matter came on regularly for hearing
on February 1. 1991, at the hour of 10:30 a.m., before the
Honorable Frank G. Noel, Judge, presiding.

Petitioner Donald Ray

Allen, being present without counsel, respondent being
represented by Kirk M. Torgensen, Assistant Attorney General and
both parties agreeing that petitioner should be allowed a new

appeal because he was not effectively represented on appeal, it
is hereby;
ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED as follows:
1.

That petitioner is to be resentenced pursuant to

State v. Johnson, 635 P. 2d 36, 38 (Utah 1981), allowing him to
pursue a new appeal.
DATED this

day of February, 1991.

HONORABLE FRANK G. NOEL
Third Judicial District Court
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the
foregoing Order was mailed, postage prepaid, to Donald Ray Allen,
pro se, P.O. Box 250, Draper, Utah

84020, this

r"11 day of

February, 1991.

\~\mi£^UtLX2a

APPENDIX H

Michael D. Murphy (#5115)
Attorney for Defendant
93 S. Main, Suite 4
Kaysville, Ut. 84037
Telephone: (801) 547-9274
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff/Appellee
vs.

*

MEMORANDUM

*

Case No. 890449-CA

DONALD R. ALLEN,
*
Defendant-Appellant.
This case comes before this court in response to the Court's
notice of sua sponte consideration for summary affirmance under
rule 10 (e), of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. For the
reasons expressed below, Defendant respectfully requests that
summary affirmance motion be denied and that defendant be allowed
to file a brief in this matter. The facts giving rise to this
appeal are as follows:
FACTS
The defendant, Donald Allen, and Donald's wife, Gwen, and
Donald's two children, lived in the basement of defendant's
parents, Margaret and Donald Scholer 388 East 2625 North Layton,
Utah residence (T.46,93). On July 23, 1988, six days after Gwen and
Donald were married, the newlyweds, Donald's two children, and Ed
and Linda Ferrin and their children, went to Mountain Green, Utah
to look at some horses (T.77,165,457). During the afternoon, the
four adults drank some beer, rode some horses, and spent time with
their children (T.457).
At approximately 10:15 p.m., Mr. and Mrs. Allen returned in

Mr- Scholer's chevy pickup to their Layton, Utah residence from the
afternoon of horseback riding (T.80). Mr. Allen brought the kids
inside and then returned to the pickup truck where he and Gwen
drank more beer and had a discussion concerning Gwen's legal
difficulties (T.465-467). Gwen talked about killing herself and
grabbed a .44 Smith and Wesson handgun from a saddleblanket inside
the truck (T.467). Donald Allen took the gun from the defendant,
and put the gun in his mouth and said "You want to see what it
looks like to see somebody die.11 (T.467). Gwen grabbed Donald's
hand, Defendant pulled back his hand, and the gun went off (T.177179, 468) . Defendant then felt his wife's head, noticed no holes in
the back of her head, noticed no blood and concluded that his wife
had not been shot (T.467-473). It was subsequently learned that
Mrs. Allen had been shot in her head (T.181, 477).
For the next week, until July 30, 1988, Mrs. Allen remained at
her Layton residence where she was attended too by Mrs. Scholer and
her husband (T.75-119). Mrs. Scholer and Mr. Allen felt that
Mrs. Allen was suffering from a hangover and injuries incurred when
she fell from the truck (T.82-85,92,116) .
On Saturday, July 30, 1988, when it became apparent that Mrs.
Allen's condition was more serious than originally thought, the
defendant and Mrs. Scholer transported Mrs. Allen to the North
Davis Humana Hospital (T. 105). A brain scan indicated that a
bullet fragments were lodged in Mrs. Allen's head (T.221). Mrs.
Allen was then transported to McKay Dee Hospital for surgery
(T.221).
Police officers interviewed Donald Allen while Donald was at
2

the Humana Hospital. Subsequent police interviews were conducted at
the McKay Dee Hospital (T.211-213). Some time latter police
searched Donald's residence and located bloody sheets and pillows
in the room where Mrs. Allen lay ill (T.427-428). The search
revealed the .44 Smith and Wesson handgun that inflicted the injury
to Mrs. Allen wrapped in a towel under the driver's seat of
Defendant's pickup and the seat cover from Mr. Scholer's pickup
(T.382, 487).
ARGUMENT
The defendant has asked his appeal counsel to argue that he
was denied his constitutional right of effective assistance of
counsel. To establish a burden of ineffective assistance of
counsel, a defendant has the burden of providing "specific
identified acts or omissions fall outside the wide range of
professionally competent assistance" and that absent counsel's
error, the result would have been different. State v. Colonna, 766
P.2d 1062, 1066 (Ut. 1988). Utah Courts of appeal have used
"several considerations relevant to ineffective assistance of
counsel claims:
(1) The burden of establishing inadequate representation is on
the defendant, "and proof of such must be a demonstrable
reality and not a speculative matter. ..A lawyer's legitimate
excerise of judgment in the choice of trial strategy or
tactics that did not produce the anticipated result does not
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel...It must appear
that any deficiency in counsel was prejudicial...[citations
omitted].
Colonna at 1066.
Defendant makes the following claims of ineffective assistance
of counsel. First, defendant in a letter to appeal counsel
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indicates that trial counsel did not read the police report or
prepare for trial until after the trial's first recess. Second,
counsel failed to make a motion to suppress evidence. Such a motion
which would have likely excluded material evidence.
Trial's counsel alleged failure to read the police report
until trial court's first recess would clearly prejudice the
defendant. The factual issues presented in Defendant's case were
complex and defense trial counsel would need to spend, at the
minimum, several days preparing for trial.
The trial transcript indicates that evidence seized from Mr.
and Mrs. Allen's bedroom, an area where defendant had a legitimate
expectation of privacy violated defendant's constitutional right of
privacy as guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution
and Article 1 section 14 of the Utah Constitution (T. 375).
Defendant also advises appeallate counsel that he indicated to
trial counsel that he was not advised of his constitution rights
per Miranda when he was interrogated by Officer David Patterson of
the Layton City Police Officer (T.204).
Donald Allen next maintains that there was insufficient
evidence to support his convinction of aggravated assault. The
standard of review applied to such claims are well known and will
be briefly stated here. A review court will
"review the evidence the evidence and all inferences that
may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most favorable
to the jury's verdict... reversing a jury conviction only when
the evidence, so viewed, is sufficently inconclusive or
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed
the crime of which he was convicted...So long as there is
some evidence, including reasonable inferences, from which
findings of all the requisite elements can reasonably be made
our inquiry stops.[citations omitted].

State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 67,84 (Ut.App. 1990),
The prosecution presented numerous witnesses and presented
many items of physical evidence to support its claim that Donald
Allen committed the crime of aggravated assault. One witness, Gwen
Allen, the only eyewitness to the shooting other than the
defendant, stated that the shooting was an accident resulting from
her intoxication and desire to possibly commit suicide (T.162-198)•
Mr, Allen also maintained that the shooting was an accident caused
by defendant's intoxication and defendant's desire to commit
suicide (T.454-516).
Taking all of the evidence into consideration, the Defendant
respectfully submits that the evidence is insufficiently conclusive
to support the jury's verdict,
CONCLUSION
Based on the above discussion, this Court should allow the
Defendant to further brief the matters in the instant case.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this S /day of November, 1991.
Michael D.^Murphy
A

Attorney for D
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I, Michael D. Murphy, hereby certify that I hand delivered
four (4) true and accurate copies of the foregoing Memorandum of
defendant-appellant to the Utah Attorney General's Office of
Criminal Appeals this (Q /

day of November, 1991.

Af\

CERTIFICATE OF LAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing Petition for ,«rit of Certiorari, to;
J, Kevin I'urphy, A.U.A.G. at 236 State Capitol, Salt -Lake Citj,
Utah 84114, on the *7v^/1
mailed at Draper, Utah*

day of January 1992, postage prepaid and

